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REFUSING TO CONCEDE THE
ELECTION: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY
BY EXPANDING THE G7 RAPID
RESPONSE MECHANISM
Taylor Hayes*
The past decade is rife with examples of actions by nefarious groups to improperly interfere in
democratic elections around the world, and it is time that democratic nations band together to
effectively combat these interference efforts. More than two dozen nations around the world have
fallen victim to some form of election interference. The United States and its allies have traced
many of these interference campaigns to state actors, particularly the Russian government.
In 2018, the Group of Seven (G7) announced the creation of a Rapid Response Mechanism
(G7 RRM). The aim of the G7 RRM is to limit the impact of election interference through
collecting and sharing information about interference campaigns. Most G7 nations have
generally complied with the requirements for the G7 RRM, but, by limiting the institution to
only G7 nations, the G7 RRM will not have a broad enough membership base to have the
necessary impact to protect elections.
The United States should take a prominent role in the development and expansion of election
security expertise by leading the creation of an Election Security Centre of Excellence
(ESCOE) accredited by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The knowledge
gained from the ESCOE should then be operationalized and incorporated into U.S. election
laws. NATO is well positioned to host an “expanded-G7 RRM,” or ESCOE. NATO has
more than four-times as many member nations as the G7, has a history of countering Russian
influence, has developed expertise relevant to election security, and its “center for excellence”
(COE) organization model would be effective to create an ESCOE. With the knowledge
gained from an ESCOE, democracies around the world can better defend their elections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A vital part of a healthy democracy is a healthy election
system. Democracies rely on elections to provide fair and accurate
results that reflect the choices made by citizens. Since elections are an
essential part of a functioning democracy, they are also an attractive
target for those wishing to disrupt or undermine either a single
democracy or the concept of democracy as a whole.
The twenty-first century is rife with examples of nefarious
groups attempting to meddle in democratic elections. If the last
decade has taught democracies around the world anything, it should
be that no nation should be caught off guard when its next election is
the target of an interference campaign. The prominence of election
interference around the world has prompted the creation of a variety
of institutions with similar, overlapping aims to combat
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disinformation generally,1 but this global problem needs a unified
institution that will gather together democracies around the globe to
develop the knowledge and techniques to effectively protect an
election from improper foreign interference. To this end, the United
States should take a prominent role in the development of election
security expertise by leading the creation of an Election Security
Centre of Excellence (ESCOE) accredited by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the knowledge gained from the
ESCOE should be incorporated into U.S. election laws.
The discussion that follows begins with Part II, which
provides a description of the concept of election interference and
examples of such interference. Part III explains the efforts of the
Group of Seven (G7) to combat election interference with the
creation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM). The G7
RRM was an important step toward securing elections in the United
States and abroad, but it was only a small step. As a result, Part IV
discusses NATO’s ability to adopt the blueprints of the G7 RRM and
create an ESCOE. Next, Part V describes the power of the U.S.
federal government to take a leadership role in the creation of an
ESCOE and subsequently implement lessons learned into U.S.
federal election laws. Finally, Part VI argues that the United States
should do just that, take a leadership role in the creation of an
ESCOE and have its expertise inform federal election laws.
II. ELECTION INTERFERENCE
The ever-growing list of democracies impacted by election
interference demonstrates the need for additional knowledge and
systems to protect democracies. Notably, the list includes the United
States and its infamous 2016 Presidential Election. Also included is
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Montenegro,

See generally SOPHIA IGNATIDOU, EU-US COOPERATION ON TACKLING
DISINFORMATION 18, 31–32 (2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default
/files/2019-10-03-EU-US-TacklingDisinformation.pdf (listing the Transatlantic
Commission on Election Integrity, the European Centre of Excellence for
Countering Hybrid Threats, and the European Rapid Alert System as a few of the
existing institutions combatting disinformation).
1
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and many more.2 At least one report suggests that Russia alone has
interfered in twenty-seven nations’ elections since 2004.3 The global
scope of election interference has created a problem that should
involve a global solution.4
Election interference can take many forms, and it is a term
that encompasses more than merely helping one candidate win an
election over another candidate. The interference could aim to
damage “trust in the election,” to create internal disruption, to
damage a nation’s external appearance, or simply to damage the
image of all democracies as a whole.5 To create interference that
accomplishes one of these goals, the interferers could (1) attack the
election administration, (2) attack “the will and ability of voters to

Russian Intervention in European Elections: Hearing before the Select Comm. on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, 115th Cong. 2–14 (2017) [hereinafter Russian
Intervention in European Elections]; see also Emma Woollacott, Russian Hackers Target
European Elections, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/emmawoollacott/2019/03/21/russian-hackers-target-european-elections/
#61ff6fe33c7c; Dan Sabbagh & Luke Harding, PM Accused of Cover-Up Over Report
on Russian Meddling in UK Politics, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2019, 4:38 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/04/no-10-blocks-russia-eureferendum-report-until-after-election.
3
Oren Dorell, Allege Russian political meddling documented in 27 countries since
2004,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
7,
2017,
6:20
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/07/alleged-russianpolitical-meddling-documented-27-countries-since-2004/619056001/; see also James
Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(July
15,
2020),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformationtaking-back-initiative-pub-82286 (describing Russia as “the dominant hostile actor
currently spreading disinformation,” while also noting that China may be “Russia’s
superior in terms of its potential capabilities”).
4 Russian Intervention in European Elections, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of
Sen. Burr, Chairman, S. Select Comm. On Intelligence) (“Facing down Russia’s
malicious activity is no longer just a bipartisan issue. To successfully protect our
institutions and the integrity of our electoral systems, we must work as a global
community to share our experience.”).
5
SEBASTIAN BAY & GUNA ŠNORE, PROTECTING ELECTIONS: A
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS APPROACH, NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 10 (2019), https://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/
file/fid/80396.
2
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participate,” or (3) attack the political debate.6 Evidence of efforts to
accomplish each of these three goals can be seen in the Russian
interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
A. Election Administration
There is evidence of an attack by Russia on U.S. election
administration systems and infrastructure. A report of the U.S.
Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence found that the “Russian
government directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and
carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure.”7 The
report further elaborated that it’s reference to election infrastructure
included attacks against voter registration databases, election-related
websites, election software, and election service companies.8 These
efforts targeted systems in all fifty states.9 Furthermore, the efforts
included extensive, targeted attacks on specific components in the
overall election system, such as a manufacturer of “devices that
maintain and verify the voter rolls.”10
B. Will and Ability
An attack on the will and ability of voters focuses on
impacting voters’ mental states. One way to do this is to attempt to
create fear. An April 2018 paper by a group of scholars explained one
method used by Russia to instill fear in American voters in 2016.11
Id. at 10–11, fig 1.
S. SELECT COMM. INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REPORT ON RUSSIAN
ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION
3 (Comm. Print 2019).
8 Id. at 6, 8.
9
David E. Sanger & Catie Edmondson, Russia Targeted Election Systems in
All
50
States,
Report
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/russian-hacking-elections.
html.
10
Matthew Cole et al., Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort
Days Before 2016 Election, THE INTERCEPT (June 5, 2017), https://theintercept.com
/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before2016-election/.
11
Dr. Emily Darraj et al., Information Operations: The Use of Information
Weapons in the 2016 US Presidential Election (Apr. 2018) (conference paper from the
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security at the University of Dublin),
6
7
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The scholars stated that in September and October of 2016 several
major news organizations featured articles stating that if Hilary
Clinton won the presidency, then Russia would go to war with the
United States.12 These articles were connected by the authors to a
Russian goal to “paralyze” voters with misinformation, checking the
box of an attack on “the will and ability of voters to participate.”13
Another way to attack the will and ability of voters is to use
one election as an example to destroy confidence in future elections.
As the United States headed into its 2020 election cycle, a January
2020 poll found that 41% of Americans think that the United States
is not prepared to ensure that November 2020 elections will be safe
and secure.14 Though one can’t claim that all of the American
skepticism captured in that poll was caused by prior attempts to
interfere in American elections, it seems equally dubious to assert that
prior interference hasn’t impacted the numbers reported.
C. Political Debate
An attack to influence the political debate is one that aims to
shape the political discussions in the nation. One example of how the
Russian campaign sought to influence the political debate was by
releasing previously private emails to influence political headlines.
The report of Special Counsel Robert Mueller on Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election explains how Russia

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324703806_Information_Operations_T
he_Use_of_Information_Weapons_in_the_2016_US_Presidential_Election.
12 Id. The story that Russia would go to war if Hillary Clinton won the
election was carried by several major news organizations including New York Daily
News and Reuters. Id.
13 Id. (noting Russian efforts to spread information “designed to paralyze”
voters).
14
Brett Neely, NPR Poll: Majority of Americans Believe Trump Encourages
Election Interference, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2020, 5:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/21/797101409/npr-poll-majority-of-americansbelieve-trump-encourages-election-interference. This same poll also found that
35% of Americans viewed misinformation has the biggest threat to our elections,
beating out the next two most popular responses which were voter fraud and voter
suppression. Id.
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sought to attack the political debate during the 2016 election cycle.15
It states how, in March 2016, Russia began gaining access to the
computers and email accounts of individuals associated with Hilary
Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Democratic National
Committee.16 The hacking continued throughout 2016, resulting in
the release of thousands of documents stolen from the various
compromised computers and accounts.17 The documents released
undoubtedly impacted the political discussion in the United States as
the leaked documents made national and international headlines.18
An interferer can also influence the political debate by
encouraging the polarization of the electorate. In the wake of the
2016 Presidential election, two political science professors conducted
a study to analyze how foreign election interference impacted
American voters.19 After giving study participants a hypothetical
about a future presidential election, the professors found that foreign
involvement in the election had a polarizing effect on American
voters. The study suggested that “[b]oth Democrats and Republicans
were far more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in
democracy, and call for retaliation when a foreign power sided with
the opposition than when a foreign power aided their own party.”20
Notably, the study found that “even modest forms of electoral
intervention divided and demoralized the country.”21

15
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION 36 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 40–43.
18 See generally Amy Chozick et al., Highlights from the Clinton Campaign Emails:
How to Deal with Sanders and Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/hillary-clinton-emailswikileaks.html; David Smith, WikiLeaks Emails: What they revealed About the Clinton
Campaign’s Mechanics, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/06/wikileaks-emails-hillary-clintoncampaign-john-podesta.
19
Michael Tomz & Jessica L. P. Weeks, Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral
Intervention,
114(3)
AM.
POL.
SCI.
R.
856
(2019),
https://
tomz.people.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj4711/f/tomzweeks-apsr-2020.pdf.
20 Id. at 857.
21 Id.
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With firsthand knowledge of the disruptive intentions and
capabilities of the foreign meddlers, namely Russia, the United States
needs to take an active role in creating a global solution to prevent or
reduce the impact of future interference efforts.
III. G7 RRM
At least a portion of the global solution necessary to combat
the rise in election interference has begun to take shape with the
recent creation of the G7 RRM. The G7 RRM is a coordination tool
created to increase the flow of election-related information to better
protect elections in the G7 nations.22 The G7 RRM is an important
first step in the journey to enhanced election security.
A. Creation of the G7 RRM
The G7 RRM was announced following the completion of
the G7 summit in Challevoix, Quebec, Canada, through the
Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique on June 9, 2018 (the
Communique).23 Paragraph 15 of the Communique stated that the
G7 was committed to taking “concerted action in responding to
foreign actors who seek to undermine our democratic societies and
institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security
as outlined in the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy
from Foreign Threats.”24
The document referenced in Paragraph 15, the Commitment
on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats (Commitment on
Defending Democracy), laid out seven additional commitments
which underpinned the G7 RRM. These included commitments to:
3. Establish a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to
strengthen our coordination to identify and respond
Jan Strupczewski, G7 to Pledge Joint Defense of Democracies from Foreign
Threats: EU Official, REUTERS (June 5, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-g7-summit-foreign-threats-idUSKCN1J12NN.
23
G7, Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique, (June 9, 2018), http://www.
g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/communique.html.
24 Id. ¶ 15.
22
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to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies,
including through sharing information and analysis,
and identifying opportunities for coordinated
response.
4. Share lessons learned and best practices in
collaboration with governments, civil society and the
private sector that are developing related initiatives
including those that promote free, independent and
pluralistic media; fact-based information; and freedom
of expression.
5. Engage directly with internet service providers and
social media platforms regarding malicious misuse of
information technology by foreign actors, with a
particular focus on improving transparency regarding
the use and seeking to prevent the illegal use of
personal data and breaches of privacy.
6. Support public learning and civic awareness aimed
at promoting critical thinking skills and media literacy
on intentionally misleading information, and
improving online security and safety.25
The G7 RRM announcement in Paragraph 15, along with the related
Commitment on Defending Democracy, is a step toward more
secure elections. However, the necessary buy-in from the United
States and other G7 nations has not always been guaranteed.
B. Complying with the Commitment
Though the United States is a member of the G7 and has
previously participated in the G7 tradition of signing on to the
communiques at the end of each summit, 2018 was a different

G7, Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy From Foreign
Threats (June 9, 2018), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/
democracy-commitment.html.
25
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story.26 U.S. President Donald Trump was present at the G7 meeting
in La Malbaie, Quebec, Canada, along with leaders from Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany. However,
President Trump broke from tradition when he stated following the
summit that the United States would not endorse the joint
communique.27 Though one could be forgiven for being confused
about the United States’ role in the G7 RRM after President Trump’s
refusal to endorse the Communique, his refusal did not result in the
United States refusing to comply with the political commitments in
the Commitment on Defending Democracy.28
By mid-2019, the United States was one of at least three G7
governments to have a group of civil servants sharing information in
the name of the G7 RRM.29 The two other nations were Canada and
the United Kingdom.30 Canada has created a G7 RRM Coordination
Unit (RRM Canada) that “serves as a permanent secretariat to the
[G7] RRM.”31 RRM Canada is to report on “threat patterns and
26 See G8 Background, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov
/archives/ag/g8-background (last updated Mar. 8, 2017). Though this source
references the “G8,” the G8 became the G7 when Russia was removed from the
Group after its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. See Andrew Restuccia & Brent D.
Griffiths, Trump Stuns Allies, Won’t Sign G-7 Joint Agreement, POLITICO (June 9, 2018,
2:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/09/trump-g7-allies-clashestrade-tariffs-russia-635006.
27 G7 Summit Ends in Disarray as Trump Abandons Joint Statement, BBC NEWS
(June
10,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44427660
(explaining that “Trump said he had instructed US officials ‘not to endorse the
communique’”).
28
It should be noted at this point that the Communique and the
Commitment on Defending Democracy are non-binding political commitments, as
are most G7 commitments. See CAMILLA BAUSCH & MICHAEL
MEHLING, Alternative Venues of Climate Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 111, 122 (2012) (“The G8 summits aim primarily
to send political signals and set trends, and do not produce binding results.”).
29
Josh Rudolph, The G7 Should Redouble Efforts to Stop Covert Foreign Money,
CIPHER BRIEF (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article
/the-g7-should-redouble-efforts-to-stop-covert-foreign-money (“Since then, three
G7 governments have launched teams of civil servants sharing threat intelligence
with each other, but thus far they’ve only focused on information operations.”).
30 Id.
31 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-
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trends” and share the information that it learns with other G7
partners.32 The United Kingdom’s Rapid Response Unit (UK RRU)
has been set up within their Government Communications Service to
focus on “news and information being shared and engaged with
online to identify emerging issues.”33 Though it’s not exactly clear
how all other G7 nations are fulfilling their political commitment, it
does appear most nations are taking steps to comply.
On February 25, 2019, the G7 Research Group at the
University of Toronto issued the 2018 Charlevoix G7 Interim
Compliance Report.34 This report explained that, for G7 nations to
be in “full compliance” with the Commitment on Defending
Democracy, the nations must take actions directed towards fulfilling
five of the seven above referenced commitments.35 The actions taken
could be through verbal responses, diplomatic actions, or physical
actions.36 The compliance report evaluated all seven nations’ progress
and found Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States to be in full compliance with the Commitment on
enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rrm-mrr.aspx?lang=eng; G7
Rapid Response Mechanism, GOV’T OF CANADA (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.
canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/01/g7-rapid-responsemechanism.html. One can even find what appears to be a job posting for the RRM
Canada. See Senior Policy Analyst, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination
Unit, Global Aff. Canada, http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/ib_lbp-_11485298
-v1-job_poster_-_senior_policy_analyst_-_g7_rapid_response_mechanism.pdf (last
visited Apr. 27, 2020).
32 G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, supra note 31; Rapid Response Mechanism
Canada, supra note 31.
33 Alex Aiken Introduces the Rapid Response Unit, GOV’T COMMC’N SERV. (July
19, 2018), https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/news/alex-aiken-introduces-the-rapidresponse-unit/. Though the UK RRM appears to be a UK component of the G7
RRM, it should be noted that the UK RRM was created before the G7 RRM
commitment was announced.
34
ANGELA MIN YI HOU ET AL., 2018 CHARLEVOIX G7 INTERIM
COMPLIANCE REPORT: 10 JUNE 2018–10 DECEMBER 2018, U. OF TORONTO (Feb.
25, 2019), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2018compliance-interim/012018-G7-interim-compliance-terrorism.pdf.
35 Id. at 17 (“Thus, for full compliance, the members must have taken
actions in 5 or more of those listed in the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending
Democracy from Foreign Threats.”). See also supra section III.A.
36 Id. at 18.
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Defending Democracy. This left Japan as the only nation found in
partial compliance, and Italy as the only nation found to be noncompliant.37
Though the University of Toronto report suggests that most
G7 nations are acting to comply with the Commitment to Defend
Democracy, very little is known about how the G7 RRM functions
and what its lasting impact will be.
C. RRM Actions
As of the spring of 2020, little information is available that
sheds light on the actual workings of the G7 RRM or its impact, but
the absence of a clear track-record for success does not undercut the
need for an organization that will facilitate international cooperation
to protect democracies from outside interference. The most concrete
information about the G7 RRM comes from the work done by RRM
Canada and the UK RRU.
RRM Canada has released three reports discussing election
interference.38 Two of these reports – one on the 2019 European
Union Parliamentary Elections and one on the 2019 provincial
elections in Alberta, Canada – found no notable evidence of foreign
interference.39 However, the third report, discussing the 2019
Ukrainian Presidential Election, found that the Ukrainian election
“was likely the target of a Russian [foreign interference] campaign
Id. at 18–38.
Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, supra note 31.
39 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, Open Data Analysis- European
Parliamentary Elections: Comprehensive Report, GOV’T OF CANADA (July 18, 2019),
https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/rrm-mrr/europeanelections-europeennes.aspx?lang=eng; Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, Open Data
Analysis- Alberta Election Analysis, GOV’T OF CANADA (May 1, 2019),
https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/rrmmrr/alberta_elections.aspx?lang=eng. See also Marianne Lavelle, ‘Trollbots’ Swarm
Twitter with Attacks on Climate Science Ahead of UN Summit, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092019/trollbot-twitterclimate-change-attacks-disinformation-campaign-mann-mckenna-greta-targeted
(discussing RRM Canada’s detection of “questionable social media activity” around
Alberta elections.)
37
38
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aimed at undermining local and international confidence in the
Ukrainian democracy.”40 The report states that RRM Canada detected
some common interference techniques, such as automated social
media accounts or “bots,” and some unusual interference techniques,
such as Russian intelligence agents renting established social media
accounts and the use of “meta-trolling.”41
The only other information regarding the actions of the G7
RRM comes from the UK RRU. In January 2019, the UK RRU
published a discussion of their actions for the year of 2018.42 The
discussion highlighted the UK RRU’s focus on news stories and
misinformation found online.43 Though these actions weren’t tied to
a specific election, the UK RRU did appear to focus heavily on
polarizing issues that will have an impact on future elections, such as
Brexit.44
There is a clear need for the G7 RRM or a similar
international mechanism to counter the impact of election
interference, but there is little information available about the G7
RRM outside of the information discussed above regarding RRM
Canada and the UK RRU. Most other mentions of the G7 RRM note
its existence but offer little information other than describing the G7
RRM as having the potential to fill the growing need for an
organization to combat election interference.45 While the G7 RRM
40 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, 2019 Ukrainian Elections Final Report,
GOV’T OF CANADA (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.international.gc.ca/gacamc/publications/rrm-mrr/ukrainian-elections-ukrainiennes.aspx?lang=eng.
41 Id. Meta-trolling was described in the report as “content designed to be
detected and called out as Russian propaganda in order to discredit the
information” contained in the post. Id.
42
Oliver Marsh, Rapid Response Unit: A Year in Digital Trends, GOV’T
COMMC’N SERV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/rapid-responseunit-a-year-in-digital-trends/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190221234436/https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/ra
pid-response-unit-a-year-in-digital-trends/].
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See generally Christopher Walker,
Safeguarding Democracies Against
Authoritarian Sharp Power, POLICY OPTIONS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://
policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2019/safeguarding-democracies-againstauthoritarian-sharp-power/ (stating that “the nascent Rapid Response Mechanism
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begins to fill that need, to better protect democracies around the
world, a mechanism similar to the G7 RRM needs to be expanded.46
IV. NATO POTENTIAL
One international organization well positioned to launch an
“expanded RRM” is NATO, and it could be launched as an ESCOE.
NATO is an organization with broader membership than the G747
and is well positioned to lead this expansion because of (1) its history
as a coalition to counter Russian influence; (2) its work to develop
expertise relevant to protecting elections from interference, including
centers focused on cooperative cyber defense and strategic
communications; and (3) the suitability of NATO’s mission specific
“centres for excellence” (COEs) as a model for the new election
security organization. By capitalizing on NATO’s position, the
United States could greatly increase its ability to protect its own
elections while simultaneously increasing the election defense
capabilities of other NATO democracies.

(RRM) initiated in 2018 under Canada’s G7 presidency to defend against foreign
threats holds promise and could offer a valuable model of cooperation for future
efforts to defend democracy and the ideas that underlie it”); Press Release, Prime
Minister’s Office, Hostile States to Face Rapid and Unified International Response
(June 9, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hostile-states-to-facerapid-and-unified-international-response; Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of
Malign Political Influence: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
Environment of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 116th Cong. 28 (2019) [hereinafter
Undermining Democracy] (statement of Laura Rosenberger, Director of the Alliance
for Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow with the German Marshall Fund)
(arguing that the response to Russian interference should include information and
coordination organizations like the G7 RRM).
46 See Undermining Democracy, supra note 45 (highlighting that “[t]ransatlantic
cooperation, including unified responses across the EU and within NATO, is
essential” to combat Russian interference).
47 Member
Countries, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm? (last visited May 3,
2020) (noting that NATO currently has 30 member nations).
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A. Counter Russian Influence
As noted above, one of the primary election interferers has
been Russia;48 and, coincidentally, NATO was born of the need to
counter Russian actions. After the end of World War II, nations on
both sides of the Atlantic sought collective security against the
growing threat from the Soviet Union. In 1949, NATO was created
as an extension of the 1948 Brussels Treaty among Western
European nations, and it allowed nations to band together against the
Soviet Union.49 Though the European nations initially sought to limit
membership in the newly created NATO to the signatories of the
Brussels Treaty and the United States, eventually the view won out
that the alliance would benefit from enlarging the group to “bridge”
the North Atlantic Ocean.50 This bridging coalition countered the
ever-present threat of the Soviet Union throughout the close of the
twentieth century, and it persists as a powerful force into the twentyfirst century.
B. Relevant Expertise
As NATO has worked to adjust to a post-cold war
international environment, it has begun to develop various COEs,
and an ESCOE could build upon the expertise in existing COEs.
COEs are mission-specific institutions created to develop knowledge
and capabilities by furthering developments in their specific area.51
NATO has already developed twenty-five COEs for issues ranging
from specialized military operations, such as “Operations in

See supra Part II.
Milestones: 1945-1952: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,
DEP’ OF STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov
/milestones/1945-1952/nato (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). The members of the
Brussels treaty were Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. Id.
50 Id.
51 See Centres of Excellence, NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION
(2019), https://www.act.nato.int/centres-of-excellence (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
48
49
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Confined and Shallow Waters,” to more generalized issues, such as
“Crisis Management and Disaster Relief.”52
Two existing COEs, the “Cooperative Cyber Defence” COE
(CCDCOE) and the “Strategic Communications” COE (SCCOE)
appear to have already laid the foundation for a potential ESCOE.53
The CCDCOE began operations in 2008 and exists to create
cooperation and information sharing channels for “exercises, law and
policy workshops, technical courses and conferences to prepare
NATO and Sponsoring Nations to detect and fight cyber-attacks.”54
Since January 2018, the CCDCOE has been tasked with educating
and training all NATO components on cyber defense.55
The SCCOE leverages NATO’s communications apparatus
to support NATO policies, operations, and activities. This includes
using “traditional media, internet-based media and public
engagement, to build awareness, understanding, and support for its
decisions and operations.”56 To fulfill this aim, the SCCOE develops
communications education courses and conducts research on

52 Centres of Excellence, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm (last updated Jan. 24,
2019). COEs are not officially part of the NATO Command Structure and are
nationally or multi-nationally funded. Id. However, even though they exist outside
the formal structure of NATO, they offer an interesting example of how NATO
nations can pool their resources and expertise.
53
Though not a NATO accredited COE, another source of relevant
expertise is the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, an
institution which currently shares information with both the European Union and
NATO. See IGNATIDOU, supra note 1, at 31.
54 Id.
55 About Us: History, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF
EXCELLENCE, https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
56 About Strategic Communication, NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategiccommunications (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
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communications related issues, such as “Robotrolling”57 and
disinformation campaigns.58
By drawing from the cyber defense expertise of the
CCDCOE as well as the strategic communications knowledge of the
SCCOE, NATO has the knowledge base to form an ESCOE that
can competently compile and distribute information to help protect
elections in member nations. An ESCOE could undoubtedly draw on
the CCDCOE’s cyber expertise to better understand how to protect
election systems and monitor infiltration attempts. Further, by
combining this cyber knowledge with the strategic communications
and messaging knowledge of the SCCOE, an ESCOE could better
understand the messaging strategies used by interfering nations on
social media platforms. Using the seven commitments laid out in the
Commitment on Defending Democracy as the guiding outline,59 a
hybrid combination of the CCDOE and the SCCOE should be more
than adequate to work toward election security.
C. Suitability of the COE Model
In addition to NATO as a whole being well positioned, the
NATO COE model appears to be well suited for the creation of an
ESCOE because COEs are designed to tackle specific subsets of
issues and can be driven by a small group of NATO nations.
Furthermore, the formal establishment and accreditation process for
a new COE does not appear to impose any insurmountable obstacles
for an ESCOE.
A new COE must go through a formal NATO establishment
process that requires at least one nation to assume a leadership role.
The first step of the establishment process is a request for a new

57
Dr. Rolf Fredheim et al., Robotrolling, NATO STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (2020), https://www.stratcomcoe
.org/robotrolling-20201.
58
Rachael Lim, Disinformation as a Global Problem- Regional Perspectives,
NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (2020),
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/disinformation-global-problem-regionalperspectives.
59 See supra Section III.A.
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COE from either NATO itself or a NATO member nation.60 Once a
request for a new COE is formulated, a particular member nation,
known as a “framework nation,” is responsible for moving it through
the establishment process.61 As the COE moves through the early
stages of the establishment process, it is important for the COE to
pick up sponsoring nations that will support the creation and
development of the COE. The establishment process is completed
when two memorandums of understanding (MOUs) are signed by
the nations that have agreed to create the COE.62
In addition to the above described steps in the COE
establishment process, the proposed COE must be accredited by
satisfying the NATO “mandatory criteria” and the less stringent
“highly desirable criteria.” The mandatory requirements are that the
new COE:
1. Further “new policies, concepts, strategies and
doctrines that transform and/or improve NATO
operational capabilities and interoperability.”
2. “Provide capabilities, not provided by other NATO
entities. . . .[and] promote the knowledge and
application of advanced concepts and doctrines. . . .”
3. “[M]aintain qualified knowledgeable and credible
Subject Matter Experts (SME) for their niche area of
expertise.”
COE CATALOGUE, ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION 5 (Dec.
2018),
https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/coe_catalogue_20190118.pdf.
61 Centres of Excellence, supra note 51. In addition to the framework nation,
there can be sponsoring nations, which contribute funds and personnel to the
centre, and contributing nations, which generally contribute funds or something
else of value. Id.
62
COE CATALOGUE, supra note 60; Guy B. Roberts, NATO’s Centers of
Excellence: A Key Enabler in Transforming NATO to Address 21st Century Security
Challenges (Oct. 8, 2014) (working paper) (“Allied nations, which agree to establish
and operate a particular COE, must sign two Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU); an ‘Operation MOU’ and a ‘Functional Relationship MOU,’ in order to
become Sponsoring Nations.”).
60
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4. Educate and train in a manner “consistent with the
quality, content and standardization of established
NATO educational policy and services.”
5. Provide safety and security “in accordance with
NATO standards and regulations.”
6. Provide accessibility to NATO nations and
agencies.
7. Maintain “open lines of communication with [the
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation],
Strategic Commands, their subordinate entities and
agencies and other nations.”63
The highly desirable criteria that the COE must strive for are
not a basis for decertification,64 and generally include promoting the
goals of the NATO Allied Command Transformation, encouraging
support and participation from NATO nations, promoting
transparency and efficient coordination of the COE, and maintaining
modern communication and information systems.65
The proposed ESCOE should not have any significant
problems meeting the demands of the NATO establishment and
accreditation requirements. First, the United States and other G7
nations are all capable of making the initial request to NATO for the
creation of a new ESCOE. The framework nation should have the
support of the other NATO members that have signed on to the G7
RRM, thus there should be little worry that the new COE would
pick-up a sufficient number of sponsoring or contributing nations.
Second, using the current blueprint of the G7 RRM as a
stand-in for the shape an ESCOE would take, the NATO
accreditation process should not be a significant hurdle. There does
not appear to be any other NATO component or COE dedicated to
protecting elections and thus an ESCOE would further new policies
63
64
65

Roberts, supra note 62.
Id.
Id.

121

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

9:1

while not duplicating existing capabilities. Though there would likely
be overlap between an ESCOE, on one hand, and CCDOE and the
SCCOE, on the other hand, an ESCOE would require capabilities
that the CCDOE and the SCCOE appear to lack. These necessary
capabilities would include in-depth knowledge of the election laws
and election technology networks in all participating nations. The
individuals who provide these necessary capabilities would certainly
also qualify as SMEs “for their niche area of expertise.”
The remaining required criteria can also be satisfied by an
ESCOE. There is nothing that would impede the COE from
educating in a manner consistent with NATO standards. Further,
there does not appear to be an impediment to an ESCOE providing
safety and security of elections in compliance with NATO standards.
Accessibility to NATO nations similarly should not be a problem
because the COE would appear to benefit from gathering
information from many different elections and sharing its knowledge
to all member nations to decrease the impact of potential election
interference campaigns. Lastly, there should not be any reason that an
ESCOE would have an issue maintaining open communication with
the various components of the NATO command structure.
V. MAKING IT HAPPEN: CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
With the need for the United States to take action quite
apparent, the individuals with the power to act need to take action.
First, the President needs to move forward with the creation of an
ESCOE. It is not entirely clear whether the MOUs to establish an
ESCOE would be binding or non-binding international agreements.66
However, regardless of the binding or non-binding nature of the
agreements, the President appears to have the authority to approve
the MOUs.67 The second step is for the lessons learned from the
ESCOE to be woven into U.S. election law. The states and the
federal government share the power to regulate and control elections
in the United States.68 However, the federal government has broad
66
67
68

See infra section V.A.
See infra section V.B.
See infra section V.C.
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powers emanating from Article I, sections 2 and 4, of the
Constitution, and those powers appear sufficient to enact the changes
needed to further secure American elections.69
A. Binding vs. Non-Binding
Until the MOUs for an ESCOE are actually drafted, one
would not know if they are intended to be binding or non-binding
international agreements. There is clear evidence that the MOUs to
establish various NATO COEs are intended to be non-binding
agreements as several MOUs expressly state that the agreement is not
“intend[ed] to create any rights or obligations under international
law.”70 However, the one NATO COE on U.S. soil, the Combined
Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, may have been
established with at least one binding MOU as there is no clear
statement in the MOU to avoid the creation of international
obligations71 and the MOU appears in the Department of State’s List
69 Id. Though it doesn’t expressly deal with elections, the necessary and
proper clause further supports these two election specific sections of the
Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); Graham August
Toney Floyd, Federalism, Elections, Preemption, and Supremacy: The Aftermath of Inter
Tribal Council, 33 MISS. C. L. REV. 235, 256 (2014) (citing Classic, 313 U.S. at 315); see
also United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
70
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment,
Administration and operation of the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of
Excellence sec. 14.4, Mar. 25, 2016, https://www.mwcoe.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/1457353348.pdf. Similar statements are found in the
following. See also Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Functional
Relationship Regarding the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence sec 8.2,
Mar.
25,
2015,
https://www.mwcoe.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/1457448557.pdf; Note of Joining by the Minister of
Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium and Amendment of the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Establishment, Administration and Operation of the Centre
of Excellence for Military Medicine sec. 14.7, July 28–Dec., 2014,
https://www.coemed.org/files/static_texts/MILMED%20COE%20OPS%20MO
U_BEL%20joining_4Dec2014.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
the Establishment, Administration and Operation of the NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence sec. 14.5, July 1, 2014, https://
m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=267690.
71
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment,
Administration, and Operation of the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea
Centre of Excellence sec. 4, May 31, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 06-531.1.

123

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

9:1

of Treaties in Force.72 Adding to the confusion is guidance from
NATO suggesting that MOUs are generally non-binding,73 while a
working paper from a former Department of Defense official
suggests COE MOUs have a binding character.74 Despite this
confusion, the President appears to have the legal authority to
approve either a binding or non-binding MOU to establish an
ESCOE.
B. The President
The constitutional powers of the President most relevant to
the ability to serve as a framework nation for the creation of an
ESCOE are the powers to negotiate, approve, and ratify the required
MOUs. Once an ESCOE is created, the President must then be able
to implement or carry out the obligations of the MOUs. Every action
of the President must be an outgrowth of power granted to the
presidency by the Constitution or an act of Congress.75 Here, the
President’s inherent powers to conduct foreign affairs and
delegations by Congress appear to place the President on solid legal
grounds. If the ESCOE MOUs turn out to be non-binding, the
President’s power to negotiate is all that is needed. However, if the
ESCOE MOUs turn out to be binding, then the President will also
need to have the power to approve the agreement.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN FORCE ON
JANUARY 1,2020 506 (2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/07/2019-TIF-Multilaterals-7-31-2019-1.pdf.
73
Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): A
Philosophical and Empirical Approach (Part I), 34 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE55, 57
(2014),
https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/legal_gazette_34a.pdf;
N. ATL. TREATY ORG., NATO LEGAL DESKBOOK, 127–29 (2d ed. 2010),
https://publicintelligence.net/nato-legal-deskbook/ (noting that MOUs are
generally non-binding, though the United States doesn’t always consider MOUs to
be non-binding).
74
Roberts, supra note 62 (referring to the MOUs as “legally binding
documents”).
75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
72
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1. Power to Negotiate
The power of the President, or the executive branch in
general, to negotiate an international agreement is well settled. As a
result, this power should not be an issue for a President seeking to
serve as a framework nation for a new ESCOE. A non-binding
international agreement can be made on the President’s power to
negotiate alone, so there is no question that the President can
authorize a non-binding MOU.76 With regard to binding international
agreements, the President’s power to negotiate has been affirmed in
conclusory fashion in cases such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation77 and the more recent Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Kerry.78
The conclusion of the Supreme Court in these two highprofile decisions was that the “President has the sole power to
negotiate treaties,” and that power appears applicable here.79 For an
ESCOE to be supported by the United States and ultimately
accredited by NATO, there must be two MOUs, and these MOUs
must first be negotiated before any party can sign on. These
negotiations would likely be conducted by officials from the
Department of Defense and the State Department. There appears to
be little problem with the President, acting through other executive
branch officials, negotiating these MOUs with other supporting
nations to begin the establishment process of an ESCOE.
76 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (2018) (“In practice Presidents
have asserted the authority to make a political commitment on practically any topic
without authorization from Congress or the Senate and without any obligation to
even inform Congress about the commitment, as long as the commitment does not
violate extant federal law.”).
77 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“In
this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates.”)
78 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (citing Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. at 319)
(“The President has the sole power to negotiate treaties.”).
79 Id.
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2. Power to Approve
The slightly more controversial step that the President would
need to take to initially establish an ESCOE is to conclude a binding
MOU. The framework to analyze the President’s power to conclude a
legally binding international agreement is an outgrowth of Justice
Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.80 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson described three distinct
categories of presidential actions: actions taken “pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress,” actions taken in the
“absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” and
actions taken contrary to the “expressed or implied will of
Congress.”81 When acting with the authorization of Congress, the
Presidency has its greatest power, and the Presidency has its least
power when acting in the face of Congressional disapproval.82 This
rigid tripart framework was transformed by Justice Rehnquist into a
“spectrum” of Presidential powers in Dames & Moore v. Regan.83 This
spectrum blended each of the three categories into a graduated scale
of Presidential power with each extreme on the scale still marked by
actions with the support of Congress and actions in the face of
Congress.84
Applying Justice Rehnquist’s spectrum of Presidential power
to the ability of the President to create an ESCOE, it appears the
President would be acting with the express approval of Congress and
thus likely has the power to conclude the necessary MOUs. The most
relevant act of Congress that research has identified is 10 U.S.C. §
344.85 In § 344, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense, “with
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
82 Id. Actions in the middle category of congressional silence place the
President in a zone of power between the two extremes.
83 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (discussing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
84 Id. at 668–69.
85
10 U.S.C.A. § 344 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140). Another
tangentially relevant statute that supports the President’s power related to an
ESCOE is 10 U.S.C. § 311. In § 311, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense
to enter “international defense personnel exchange agreements” with other nations.
80
81
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the concurrence of the secretary of State,” to have American
personnel participate in a “multinational military center of
excellence.”86 A multinational military center of excellence is defined
in § 344 as “an entity sponsored by one or more nations that is
accredited and approved by the Military Committee of [NATO].”
Further, § 344 requires that the American participation in the center
of excellence be pursuant to “the terms of one or more memoranda
of understanding entered into by the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State.”87 This section appears to be
an express authorization from Congress for the President to enter
into the MOUs necessary to create an ESCOE and places the
President near the top of the Rehnquist spectrum.88 An action with
the express authorization of Congress “would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions” that the President has the requisite
power.89
3. Power to Ratify
The final step for a binding agreement is for the President to
formally ratify the agreement. The final act of ratification through
which a nation “expresses its ‘intent to be bound,’” is an event

Such agreements would involve American personnel being sent to another nation
or a security organization and the U.S. government paying the costs of sending its
personnel abroad. Further context for the powers afforded the Secretary of
Defense through § 311 is that it is found in the “Military-to-Military Engagements”
subchapter of title 10.
86
The power to authorize the participation of American personnel
through § 344 is subject to the requirements that the participation enhance the
military forces of the participating nation and that the personnel “improv[e the]
interoperability” of the forces. 10 U.S.C.A. § 344. Neither of these restrictions
seems to impose a problem for the action contemplated in this Note.
87
10 U.S.C.A. § 344 (emphasis added).
88 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1213 (stating that Congress can
give the President “general advance authorization to make an agreement (or many
agreements) that the President in his or her broad discretion can negotiate,
conclude, and ratify without ever returning to Congress for its review, much less
approval”).
89 Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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separate from the signing of the agreement.90 Not until an agreement
is ratified does it become fully binding on the ratifying nation.91
Generally, the act of ratification is to deposit an “instrument of
ratification” with a designated nation or international organization.92
The act of ratification can only be accomplished by the President
and, in the case of an agreement that has been authorized by an
already existing statute, the President does not need to consult with
Congress before undertaking an act of ratification.93 As a result, there
should be no issues with the President’s ratifying any binding MOUs
for the establishment of an ESCOE.
iv.

Presidential Power to Implement

Once the MOUs for an ESCOE are completed, all that is left
for the President to do is implement the MOUs and carry out the
obligations. Though it may sometimes be a battle for the President to
get Congress to agree to fund a specific project, that should not be
the case for an ESCOE. There should be little problem with the
President’s implementation here because of the authority conferred
by Congress in § 344 as the statute expressly permits the use of funds
appropriated to the Department of Defense for satisfying the United
States’ NATO COE obligations.94 Furthermore, § 344 authorizes the
use of Department of Defense “[f]acilities and equipment” to
support NATO COEs.95 Through the broad authority conferred by
§ 344, the President should be confident in his ability to satisfy the
funding obligations of an ESCOE. Once the President has completed
the above described steps, attention then turns to Congress’ ability to
incorporate the lessons learned from an ESCOE into U.S. election
law.

90
Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 313 (2007).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 307.
93 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1213.
94
10 U.S.C.A. § 344.
95 Id.
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C. Congressional Authority to Implement
Article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides
that “the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”96
This section has been interpreted as allowing the states to “define
who [is] to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and
the constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote
for members of congress in that state.”97 Article I, section 4
supplements the statement in section 2 and explains that it is the
power of each state to set the “times, places and manner” for electing
members of the House of Representatives and Senators, “but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations,
except as to the places of choosing Senators.”98 The United States
Supreme Court has explained the impact of section 4 as granting
authority for Congress “to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices,
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention
of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors
and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.”99
The effect of these two sections is that Congress has the
power to preempt state regulations regarding an election that involves
votes for federal offices. This includes a “mixed election,” an election
where both state and federal positions are up for a vote, even when
the Congressional regulation is violated without a clear intent to
interfere with a vote for a federal office.100

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884) (explaining Article I, section
2 of the Constitution).
98
U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
99 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
100 See Ex parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 754–55 (1888) (discussing that an
individual can violate a law designed to protect a federal elections by merely
interfering with the election process or procedure set out by law, even if the
individual lacks an intent to influence the election with regard to a federal office);
see also United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1009-12 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]hen
federal and state candidates are together on the same ballot, Congress may regulate
any activity which exposes the federal aspects of the election to the possibility of
96
97
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VI. MAKING IT HAPPEN: BUILDING FROM EXISTING LAWS
The most effective way to operationalize the knowledge
gained from the international community would be for Congress to
act. Congress should exercise its authority to regulate federal
elections and set election interference prevention requirements for all
states. The broad authority granted to Congress under Article I,
section 4 gives Congress the power to impose requirements on state
election officials to provide information to the federal government
about potential incidents of election interference and to mandate that
states have voting systems in place that satisfy minimum, baseline
requirements created by an ESCOE. Though the exact shape that
this new legislation should take is beyond the scope of this Note, one
could imagine new federal legislation growing from the foundation
laid by 50 U.S.C. § 3371b and 52 U.S.C. § 21081.
A requirement for states to provide information to the federal
government about potential incidents of election interference could
build on 50 U.S.C. § 3371b.101 Through § 3371b, the Department of
Homeland Security is authorized to share “classified information
related to threats to election systems and to the election process”
with designated state government officials.102 To facilitate a flow of
information from state governments to the federal government and
an ESCOE, Congress should draft new legislation that compliments
§ 3371b and flips the flow of information so that states are required
to report any information related to threats to election systems and
the election process to the Department of Homeland security. Many
states likely already have processes in place to facilitate this flow of
information but imposing such a requirement may prompt states to
share the information quicker and allow more time for a meaningful
response from the federal government.
Congress could also enact legislation that provides an election
systems baseline informed by ESCOE expertise. This baseline could
corruption, whether or not the actual corruption takes place and whether or not the
persons participating in such activity had a specific intent to expose the federal
election to such corruption or possibility of corruption.”).
101
50 U.S.C.A. § 3371b (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140).
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be modeled on 52 U.S.C. § 21081,103 a statute enacted in 2002
seemingly to avoid a repeat of the 2000 Presidential Election’s
“hanging chad issue.”104 This section imposes a series of minimum
requirements for election systems. Congress should either update
§ 21081 to reflect the requirements for modern election systems or
leave the section as it is and mirror its format in new legislation. This
new election baseline statute would be the ideal way to put the
knowledge of an ESCOE to use.
Without Congress taking this final step to implement the
lessons learned from an ESCOE, the United States might not reap
the maximum possible benefits from its efforts to create an ESCOE.
As the 2016 Presidential Election made clear, the United States has
room to improve its election security, and without federal action
there may be no action taken to correct this problem. The reality of
having an election system that relies on federalism means that unless
Congress steps and exercises its powers to preempt state policies,
election security and infrastructure often relies heavily on small local
governments.105 Without a guiding federal hand, it simply seems
unrealistic to rely on a local county government to implement the
international wisdom gained from an ESCOE.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States and its NATO allies have felt the
disruption that can be caused by election interference, and it is time
to take additional steps to prevent future interference by developing
an ESCOE. The groundwork for this next step has been laid by the
G7 RRM. The United States should take a prominent role in building
on the G7 RRM’s groundwork by leading the creation of an Election
Security Centre of Excellence (ESCOE) accredited by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the President and
52 U.S.C.A. § 21081 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140).
See Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 591
(2003) (discussing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116
Stat. 1666, 1666-1730, which included the provision now codified at 52 U.S.C.
§ 21081).
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Congress should take the actions within their authority to weave the
knowledge gained from an ESCOE into U.S. election laws.
Once the President and Congress have completed their roles,
it is important that the strategies and methods of protecting elections
be distributed beyond the G7 nations for the democracies around the
globe to be secure in their election results. Allowing this knowledge
to be more widely shared will continue to raise the costs and efforts
needed to interfere in elections, a necessary deterrent. With this
deterrent in place, the United States and democracies around the
world will be able to better ensure that they have a healthy election
system and that the system has the confidence of the people
necessary for sustaining democracy.
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